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complete one of four Go/No-Go reaction time tasks. Implicit bias was measured using the Implicit
Association Test. Results suggest that manipulating social categorization alone does not reduce implicit racial
bias.
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Abstract 
Researchers have posited that implicit racial bias is rooted in social categorization, and 
could therefore be reduced by targeting categorization processes. Two models have 
shown promise: Common Ingroup Identity, whereby members of different groups come 
to see themselves as one group, and Dual Identity, whereby members of different groups 
maintain their group identities, while creating a superordinate identity. Because previous 
researchers often did more than instruct participants to categorize differently, however, 
one cannot be sure that the observed effects resulted from categorization changes. This 
study’s purpose was to determine whether manipulating the way people categorize social 
stimuli is sufficient to reduce bias, and if so, to identify which model is most effective. 
Categorization was manipulated by randomly assigning participants to complete one of 
four Go/No-Go reaction time tasks. Implicit bias was measured using the Implicit 
Association Test. Results suggest that manipulating social categorization alone does not 
reduce implicit racial bias. 
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Is the Manipulation of Social Categorization Sufficient to Reduce Implicit Racial 
Bias? 
African Americans are now allowed to vote, go to school, and live in 
neighborhoods with Whites, and overt discrimination is no longer tolerated in U.S. 
society. However, that does not mean that prejudice no longer exists. Instead, prejudice 
now operates unconsciously and may be expressed inadvertently (Amodio, 2008; 
Amodio, 2014; Gaertner, 1993). Just the presence of a person from another group can 
activate implicit attitudes and stereotypes, even in the absence of explicit negative 
attitudes toward that group (Gaertner, 2016; Nelson, 2006).  
 Many researchers have tried to understand how implicit biases and stereotypes 
develop (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Stephan, 
1985; Tajfel 1978, and Turner, 1981). A common explanation traces their roots to social 
categorization, an inevitable aspect of human cognition that occurs because people are 
exposed to so many stimuli in their environment that they must organize massive 
quantities of information. Amodio (2006) explains that once individuals have categorized 
the world around them, they start to make generalizations about members of the 
categories they have created. These generalizations form the basis of stereotypes, which  
then have great behavioral, emotional, and cognitive consequences: they play a role when 
individuals are exposed to people who are, or are not, part of people’s ingroup. 
According to Nelson (2006), prejudice begins at an individual level, but eventually, 
relationships between groups are influenced by the social categories that each individual 
has formed. Those intergroup interactions, lack thereof, often reinforce stereotypes and 
biases toward outgroup members.  
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Because implicit prejudice tends to occur below conscious awareness and 
categorization is an automatic process, it is difficult for people to reduce their biases 
(Cikara & Bavel, 2014; Jones & Foley, 2003; Nosek & Banaji, 2002; Todd, 
Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011). However, since categorization plays such a 
prominent role in the formation of racial prejudice, researchers have attempted to 
manipulate the ways in which perceivers categorize, in the hopes of reducing prejudice.  
Reducing Implicit Racial Bias by Manipulating Social Categorization Processes: 
Competing Models 
Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis states that the most effective way to decrease 
conflict (prejudice) among groups is to increase interpersonal contact. The 
personalization model (Brewer & Miller, 1984) is based on Allport’s hypothesis; it 
suggests that exposure to an outgroup member will facilitate perceptions of his or her 
unique characteristics and enhance familiarity among members of the groups, thereby 
allowing the quality and quantity of interactions to increase. Ensari, Christian, Kuriyama, 
and Miller (2012) stress that the personalization model has five components: (1) 
individuation, (2) decategorization, (3) self-other comparison, (4) empathy, and (5) self-
disclosure.  
 Individuation. According to Ensari et al. (2012), this component of 
personalization acknowledges the distinct identity of an individual outgroup member 
(e.g., a person’s traits or attributes), but does not require direct interaction or retrieval of 
the stereotypes linked to that outgroup. It results in an evaluation of each person based on 
his or her merits, not any of the stereotypes linked to that individual's group.  
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 Decategorization. Ensari et al. (2012) noted that unlike individuation, 
decategorization requires an individual to retrieve the stereotypes linked to the outgroup 
and then alter these cognitions. This alteration can be achieved by recalling the 
stereotypes linked to that outgroup and distinguishing that individual from the outgroup 
stereotype.  
 Self-other comparison. Ensari et al’s. (2012) self-other comparison component 
involves a bottom-up process. It requires people to evaluate the attributes of an outgroup 
member in relation to themselves. The evaluation allows people to compare themselves 
to outgroup members and acknowledge similarities that they may share (e.g., attributes 
and traits). According to Miller (2002), this process may promote empathetic 
understanding because it involves constant conversation between the groups so that 
members might be able to step into each others’ perspectives.  
 Self-disclosure. Ensari et al’s. (2012) self-disclosure component involves 
revealing intimate information about oneself to an outgroup member. This creates 
vulnerability on the part of the individual who is disclosing, but it also creates trust 
between the individuals. In addition, Miller (2002) mentioned that the new intimate 
relationship created by self-disclosure allows for the disconfirmation of negative 
stereotypes.  
 Empathy. Finally, Ensari et al. (2012) believed that understanding another 
person’s condition from that person's perspective can reduce prejudice. This component 
of the personalization model has two parts: (1) emotional empathy, the ability of an 
individual to experience the same emotions as another person and (2) cognitive empathy, 
the ability to understand an individual’s perspective.  
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 Gaertner (1993) proposed an alternative approach called the common ingroup 
identity model, which posits that intergroup bias and conflict can be reduced by factors 
that transform members’ cognitive representation from two separate groups into one 
common ingroup. This transformation is designed not to eliminate categorization, but to 
create a common ingroup; this recategorization is then expected to reduce intergroup bias 
and conflict. Gaertner (1993) based this hypothesis on Brewer’s (1979) analyses of social 
identity theory and self-categorization theory. First, Brewer stated that intergroup bias is 
related to admiring one’s ingroup and not necessarily devaluing an outgroup. Second, she 
argued, group formation allows members to relate to one another and distance themselves 
from members of an outgroup. Thus, circumstances that succeed at creating one group 
should lead to cognitive and motivational processes that produce positive attitudes toward 
former outgroup members.   
 More recently, Gonzalez and Brown (2003) proposed the dual identity model. 
Here the aim is for the two groups to maintain their group identities while invoking a 
superordinate identity. For example, according to this model, a person interacting with a 
racial outgroup member could be encouraged to acknowledge his or her racial group 
membership, but also to notice that the other-race person is a fan of the same sports team 
(i.e., they share a common ingroup). According to Gonzalez and Brown (2003), this 
allows the two groups to perceive commonality, while still maintaining membership in 
their original group. The maintenance of their original group membership is said to lead 
to less psychological stress than ignoring it because being integrated into a larger 
category can produce anxiety or fear in some individuals, especially minority group 
members who tend to identify more strongly with their ingroups.  
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Research Evidence 
Although the personalization, common ingroup identity, and dual identity models 
specify different ways in which manipulating social categorization might reduce 
prejudice, all three models have received some empirical support. Some illustrative 
examples follow.  
  Personalization model: Decategorization. Jones and Foley (2003) taught fourth-
grade students to decategorize in order to see whether it would decrease prejudice in 
classrooms. In the experimental (decategorization) condition, researchers presented a 
PowerPoint slideshow about race that included information about (a) anthropology 
(where the earliest human bones were found, human ancestry, how bodies adapt to their 
environment, levels of melanin and skin tones), (b) biology (the amount of genetic 
similarity across different cultures), and (c) “The Melting Pot” (to show that people in 
America have come from all over the world). In the control condition the experimenter 
read Oh, The Places You’ll Go!, by Dr. Seuss, to the students. Jones and Foley then gave 
all the children The Racial De-Categorization Scale. Children in the experimental 
condition were found to categorize less and hold less negative racial perceptions.  This 
suggests that children can be taught material that decreases the salience or validity of 
boundaries between groups, which will then allow children to perceive similarities rather 
than differences when viewing themselves and others. Jones and Foley concluded that it 
may be beneficial to incorporate decategorization lessons into academic curricula. 
Personalization model: Empathy. Todd et al. (2011) investigated the impact of 
perspective taking on automatic interracial reactions and behaviors. Participants were 
assigned to one of three conditions: perspective-taking-other, perspective-taking-self, and 
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objective focus. All participants watched a 5-minute video of a Black and White man 
interacting at a car dealership, but the instructions they received before watching the 
video differed across conditions. Participants in the perspective-taking-other condition 
were given instructions to visualize what they thought the Black man was thinking, 
feeling and experiencing. Participants in the perspective-taking-self condition were 
instructed to imagine what they themselves would be thinking, feeling and experiencing 
if they were the Black man. Finally, participants in the objective condition were asked to 
remain emotionally detached. After watching the video, participants completed the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT), a test that assesses automatic racial associations. Their 
results showed that participants in the perspective-taking-other and perspective-taking-
self condition scored significantly lower on the IAT (indicating less pro-White bias) than 
participants in the objective condition. These findings show that adopting the perspective 
of a Black target in one context (i.e., the video) can affect individuals’ automatically 
activated interracial evaluations in another context (i.e., the IAT).   
Common ingroup identity model: Recategorization. Crisp and Beck (2016) 
tested Gaertner’s (1993) common ingroup hypothesis. They tried to get participants from 
an ingroup (students at Birmingham University) to relate to members of an outgroup 
(students from Aston University) and form a common ingroup. In order to facilitate a 
common ingroup identity, the researchers had students in the experimental condition 
write down up to five things that the students at the University of Birmingham and 
students at the University of Aston may have in common (e.g., clubs, sports, religion, or 
major) and then complete an ingroup favoritism measure. The control group, instead, had 
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to complete only the ingroup favoritism measure. At the end of the experiment, the 
experimental group was found to have significantly lower levels of ingroup favoritism.  
 Common ingroup identity model: Decategorization. Unlike Crisp and Beck 
(2016), who studied real-life ingroups and outgroups, Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, and 
Dovidio (1989) created novel ingroups and outgroups, using the minimal group paradigm 
(Tajfel 1971).  Previous research using this paradigm has shown that creating even 
arbitrary and virtually meaningless distinctions between groups (e.g., randomly assigning 
some members to the blue team and others to the green team) can trigger a tendency to 
favor one’s own group (Tajfel 1971). Gaertner et al. (1989) first created new ingroups by 
placing participants into three-person groups and giving them identity tags to differentiate 
them from the other groups. Each group was then given a decision making task, designed 
to induce intergroup interaction. Afterward, two of the three-person groups got to interact 
with one another and Gaertner et al. were able to test two strategies of manipulating 
social categorization directly: decategorization and recategorization.   
 In the one-group (recategorization) condition, members of each group were 
placed into a larger room and seated alternately (i.e., ABABAB) and were asked to create 
a new name for their now six-person group. In the two-group (control) condition, 
members of each subgroup sat adjacent to one another (i.e., AAABBB) and kept their 
original group names. In the separate-individuals (decategorization) condition, each 
member was isolated after the initial subgroup interaction and was asked to create a 
nickname for him or herself to replace the former group name.  After the intergroup 
interaction, participants in the one-group (recategorization) and separate-individuals 
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(decategorization) conditions exhibited less ingroup bias than those in the two-groups 
(control) condition.  
Dual identity model: Maintenance of original group and creation of common 
ingroup identity. Richeson and Nussbaum (2003) comapred two approaches, 
colorblindness (decategorization) and multiculturalism (dual identity), in the hopes of 
finding the route that leads to more interracial harmony. The idea behind colorblindness 
is that racial categories should be disregarded and everyone should be treated as an 
individual. Thus, it is a decategorization strategy. Multiculturalism, instead, is a dual 
identity approach. It is based on the proposition that not only should group differences be 
acknowledged, they should be celebrated. The multiculturalism perspective assumes that 
if racial categories are ignored, non-whites may feel that their heritage is being 
undermined, which could be detrimental to them. To manipulate participants’ 
perspectives, Richeson and Nussbaum (2003) randomly assigned participants to read a 
one-page summary that endorsed either the multicultural or the color-blind approach. 
Afterwards, participants were asked to write down five reasons why multiculturalism or 
colorblindness (depending on the summary they had read) is a positive approach to 
creating harmony among different ethnic groups. After they wrote their statements, they 
were given a list of responses that other participants had provided and were asked to 
circle the statements they agreed with. The participants then completed a measure of 
implicit bias (the IAT). These researchers found that participants in the multiculturalism 
condition showed less automatic racial bias compared to those in the colorblindness 
condition; this result demonstrates that the dual identity model is a more effective 
approach than common ingroup identity in promoting interracial harmony. 
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 Glasford and Dovidio’s (2011) study also compared common ingroup and dual 
identity approaches. However, unlike Richeson and Nussbaum (2003) and other research 
groups, they were not interested in the responses of advantaged-group members toward 
disadvantaged-group members. Instead, they were interested in the disadvantaged-group 
members’ willingness to engage in intergroup contact while still maintaining motivation 
to support social change. Participants were given one of two news reports: (1) a report 
designed to increase the salience of a superordinate identity (American; i.e., common 
ingroup) or (2) a report designed to make both a common identity (American) and a 
subordinate (racial/ethnic) identity salient (i.e., dual identity). Participants then responded 
to questions assessing their willingness to engage in contact with Whites, optimism about 
the future of race relations, and social change motivation. Richeson and Nussbaum’s 
results revealed that the common ingroup manipulation increased optimism, but it also 
decreased social change motivation. On the other hand, the dual identity manipulation 
increased disadvantaged-group members' willingness to have contact with White people 
and their social change motivation. Overall, it appears that creating a dual identity is a 
more effective means of maintaining minorities’ willingness to have contact with White 
people. 
 Decategorization, common ingroup identity, and dual identity compared. 
Cameron, Rutland, Douch and Brown (2006) tested three models: decategorization, 
common in-group identity, and dual identity, to see which would be more effective in 
changing children’s intergroup attitudes toward refugees. In all conditions they defined 
the term “refugee,” and provided the children with examples of who would be considered 
a refugee. Each of the interventions required a story to be told to the children. The story 
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involved an ingroup member who had close relationships with outgroup members (i.e., 
refugees), but other details varied across interventions.  
For example, in the decategorization condition, participants were told a story 
illustrating specific characteristics that each refugee character had (e.g., Joe likes animals 
or Jill enjoys computer games) and were asked to remember those characteristics. In the 
common ingroup identity condition participants were told that the characters in the story 
attended their school. The text stressed the name of the school and names of teachers that 
the students had. Finally, in the dual identity condition the researchers stressed both the 
common ingroup identity (i.e., school) and the characters’ subgroup memberships (i.e., 
refugee and the same nationality as the participants). After the intervention, Cameron et 
al. (2003) asked the children to rate refugees on positive and negative traits from the 
Preschool Racial Attitude Measure- II (PRAM-II) and their results revealed that dual 
identity intervention was the most effective in reducing children’s negative outgroup 
attitudes toward refugees.  
Limitations of Previous Research  
All of the studies discussed were based on the idea that changing the way that 
people categorize outgroup members can reduce prejudice (or improve intergroup 
attitudes) and all of them had some success in doing so, but most of them did not 
manipulate categorization directly and in isolation. One exception was Gaertner et al’s 
(1989) study, but even that study had several limitations.  For example, they used 
minimal groups (i.e., he randomly assigned people to a novel ingroup rather than 
studying real-life ingroups and outgroups).  Although the minimal groups paradigm has 
been widely used and has revealed that merely dividing people into groups is sufficient to 
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trigger ingroup biases (Tajfel, 1971), it may be much more difficult to modify the ways 
people categorize preexisting ingroups than it is to get them to recategorize arbitrary 
groups. In addition, Gaertner et al. measured explicit biases by asking participants to rate 
their group members on multiple variables, and such ratings may be subject to social 
desirability biases and demand characteristics.  
The remaining researchers’ categorization manipulations (Cameron et al., 2006; 
Crisp & Beck, 2016; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Jones & Foley, 2003; Richeson & 
Nussbaum, 2003; Todd et al., 2011) did not directly target categorization alone, but 
instead included interventions that allowed participants to interact with one another. 
Thus, one cannot be sure that categorization changes were the reason behind the changes 
in attitudes. For example, in Cameron et al’s (2006) comparison of the decategorization, 
common ingroup identity, and dual identity models, the researchers had children read 
friendship stories that included students from their school and refugees. The stories could 
have exposed the participants to similarities they may share with refugees, but that does 
not mean that they now view refugees as part of their ingroup. Also, since they were 
exposed to refugees’ positive traits, it is not a surprise that under all conditions the 
children reduced their negative outgroup attitudes; it is possible that these students came 
to associate positive traits with refugees because positive factors were included in the 
friendship story. A more direct test of the impact of categorization changes is needed.  
Reducing Implicit Bias with the Go-No/Go Association Task (GNAT)  
In order to know whether the manipulation of categorization itself is truly 
reducing prejudice it must be clear that what is being manipulated is categorization only, 
there must be no other confounds present, and implicit bias must be measured. The one 
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 12 
study I am aware of that seems to come closest to this is an experiment by Cerruti and 
Shin (Lai et al., 2014; Intervention 15, Study 2) that investigated whether exposure to the 
Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT) (experimental condition) would reduce implicit bias 
when compared to a control condition (no exposure to the GNAT). Developed by Nosek 
and Banaji (2001), the GNAT is a computerized reaction time task, which presents 
participants with two stimuli on every trial (in Cerruti and Shin’s study, a photo of either 
a Black or a White person, and either a good or a bad word). Participants are then 
instructed to either respond (click the space bar) or not respond (refrain from clicking the 
space bar) when a specific stimulus appears on the screen. For example, if the 
instructions were to say “’Go’ when you see a black person paired with a positive word,” 
then participants should press the spacebar only if a black person’s photo appears on the 
screen at the same time as a positive word (e.g., Black person and "joy"). If any other 
pairing were to appear, the participants would be expected to withhold their response 
(i.e., not press the spacebar). The GNAT allowed Cerruti and Shin to control the category 
in which participants placed the Black or White targets. Moreover, by constructing the 
GNAT such that the majority of the trials consisted of Black targets paired with good 
words, these researchers were able to force participants to associate Black people with 
positive words. Consistent with the researchers' expectations, completing the GNAT 
reduced participants' levels of implicit racial prejudice.  
However, the reduction in implicit prejudice these researchers observed may not 
have been because their participants changed the way they categorized. In fact, Cerruti 
and Shin were not testing categorization processes per se. Rather, they were interested to 
see if a learning paradigm known as evaluative conditioning could be used to reduce 
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implicit racial prejudice. This paradigm involves manipulating the evaluation of a 
stimulus by having that stimulus associated with another stimulus that an individual 
already likes or dislikes. The GNAT may have merely changed the valence of Black 
faces (stimuli originally viewed negatively) by pairing them with positive words. The 
constant pairing of Black faces with good words participants creates an association 
between Black faces and good words. However, this association does not necessarily 
mean that participants now view those Black faces as part of their ingroup. 
The Proposed Research: Direct Manipulation of Categorization 
Previous research suggests that changing the way in which perceivers categorize 
outgroup members may help to reduce prejudice, and that encouraging perceivers to 
recognize their dual identities may be the most effective way of doing so.  However, 
much of that research either relied on broad manipulations that probably affected more 
than perceivers' categorization schemes, or failed to examine how manipulating 
perceivers' categorization schemes impacts perceptions of real-life ingroups and 
outgroups. Recent research suggests that encouraging Whites to associate Blacks with 
positive attributes can reduce implicit racial bias, but it is unclear whether the same 
effects could be produced by simply encouraging Whites to categorize Blacks as ingroup 
members. 
Accordingly, the purpose of the proposed research was to: (a) determine whether 
manipulating the manner in which people categorize social stimuli can, by itself, reduce 
implicit racial bias, and if so (b) to identify which type of categorization manipulation is 
most effective.  Participants were randomly assigned to perform one of four different 
computerized categorization tasks (evaluative conditioning, common in-group identity, 
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dual identity, or a non-human categorization control), and then complete measures of 
both implicit and explicit racial bias. 
I expected to replicate Cerruti and Shin's finding that completing the GNAT 
reduces implicit racial bias (Lai et al., 2014; Intervention 15, Study 2). Moreover, to the 
extent that modifying social categorization–in the absence of evaluative conditioning—is 
sufficient to reduce implicit bias, I expected to see reduced bias in all conditions but the 
non-human categorization control condition.  I also had reason to suspect, based on 
previous research, that participants in the dual identity condition would show the greatest 
reduction in implicit bias because this approach allows participants to acknowledge their 
commonality with outgroup members but also hold on to their current ingroup 
identification. However, I did not think the categorization manipulations would have any 
impact on participants’ levels of explicit prejudice, because social desirability biases 
already push people to deny their overt biases.  
Method 
Participants 
 This study included 148 Lake Forest College students (28 male, 120 female). The 
racial/ethnic composition of the sample is presented in Table 1. Because the focus of the 
research was on reducing non-Blacks' implicit prejudice toward Blacks, I analyzed only 
the responses of non-Black participants (N = 143; 28 males, 115 females). All 
participants in this study were volunteers, most of whom (N = 111) were solicited with 
the help of psychology professors who agreed to award students a small amount of extra 
credit for their participation. If students could not participate or felt uncomfortable 
participating, but still wanted extra credit, they were given an alternative assignment 
which entailed reading a brief article and writing a short summary of its contents. To help 
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ensure that students did not feel coerced to participate by their psychology professors, I 
did not inform faculty about which students participated until the very end of the 
semester, just in time for faculty to submit final grades. The remaining 38 participants 
were recruited by reaching out to Greek organizations on campus.  
Overview 
 To determine whether manipulating racial categorization alone can reduce 
implicit racial bias, and examine possible differences in the effectiveness of different 
categorization manipulations, participants were randomly assigned to perform one of four 
different computerized categorization tasks (evaluative conditioning, common in-group 
identity, dual identity, or nonhuman categorization control).  They then completed the 
IAT, a measure of implicit prejudice, followed by the Symbolic Racism 2000 scale 
(SR2K) a measure of explicit racial bias. Finally, participants were given a demographics 
questionnaire that asked about their sex, race, ethnicity, previous exposure to the IAT, 
political identity, and country of primary citizenship.  
Procedure  
 Sessions were run in groups of one to three people. When participants arrived at 
the Social Psychology Lab (Hotchkiss room 8) they were seated at a Windows 7 
computer (21-inch LED monitor; 1400 X 900 dpi). The entire experiment was presented 
on the computer, and was administered using MediaLab v2008.1.33 and DirectRT 
Precision Timing Software Version 2008.2.103.1115. Participants were presented with: 
(1) the consent form (see Appendix A), (2) the categorization task (labeled as the “Hit-or-
Hold Game”), (3) the IAT (labeled as the “Group’em Game,” (4) a questionnaire that 
consisted of SRK2 scale (see Appendix B), a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix 
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C) and (5) the debrief form (see Appendix D). Over-the-ear headphones were also 
provided to reduce outside noise. The standard protocol was:  
Hi. Thank you for participating in my study. Before you begin I will briefly  
 explain what you will be doing. First you will read the consent form and if  
 you agree to participate in my study you will then play two reaction time games.   
These games will require that you use the “E”, “I” or spacebar (you will be 
instructed when to use which key). After you complete the consent form a 
magenta screen will appear; this means Game One is loading. Please be patient. 
After you finish Game One, the magenta screen will appear again; this means 
Game Two is loading. Once you complete the two reaction time games you will 
be asked to answer some questions.  If there is a question you feel uncomfortable 
answering feel free to leave it blank. If at any moment you feel uncomfortable 
during the game, you may leave. If any of the instructions are confusing feel free 
to ask me anything that would clarify that confusion. Whenever you are ready, put 
these headphones on and begin the experiment. 
 After the participants completed the experiment they were debriefed, and asked if 
they had any questions. They were reminded that because the experiment was still in 
progress they should not discuss it with anyone. Participants were also offered a printed 
copy of the consent form to take with them if they wished. 
Experimental Conditions: Types of Categorization Tasks  
 The research design was a between-subjects experiment with one independent 
variable: type of categorization task. That independent variable had four levels 
(evaluative conditioning, common in group, dual identity, and non human categorization 
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control) to which participants were randomly assigned. All categorization tasks consisted 
of different variations of a 100-trial Go-No/Go task that were designed to manipulate the 
way in which participants categorized stimuli. Direct RT was used to present stimuli and 
record reaction times. However, the various versions of the Go/No-Go task were used 
only to force participants to categorize in specific ways (by responding to the specific 
stimulus pairings required in a given condition) and the data were not analyzed to see 
how well participants actually performed on the task. Table 2 displays the distribution of 
trials by categorization condition. 
Evaluative conditioning. Participants in this group completed the Go-No/Go 
association task (GNAT) as used by Cerruti and Shin (Lai et al., 2014; Intervention 15; 
Study 2). The GNAT employs evaluative conditioning, a learning paradigm that changes 
the valence of one stimulus by pairing that stimulus with another (positively or negatively 
valued) stimulus. Participants in this group were instructed to respond (click the space 
bar) when they saw a photo of a Black person paired with a positive word (e.g., Black 
person and the word “joy”) and refrain if they saw any other pairing (White person + 
positive word, White person + negative word or Black person + negative word; see 
Figure 1). Cerruti and Shin administered the GNAT using Inquisit software. I 
reprogrammed this task (and the Go-No/Go tasks for the other experimental conditions) 
utilizing DirectRT software but using Cerruti and Shin’s photos of Black and White 
individuals (retrieved from https://osf.io/lw9e8/). The distribution of trial pairings was 
provided by Cerruti (personal communication, September 18, 2016).  
 Common ingroup identity. In this condition, participants completed a Go/No-Go 
task designed to make them categorize social stimuli based on school affiliation (Lake 
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Forest College) instead of race. They were presented with a series of stimuli, each 
consisting of a photo of a person (White or Black) paired with a school label representing 
the participants’ own institution (Lake Forest College) or a rival institution (St. Norbert 
College). Participants were asked to “go” (press the spacebar) if the stimulus presented 
was affiliated with their ingroup (Lake Forest College) and withhold their response if the 
stimulus was affiliated with the outgroup (St. Norbert College) (see Figure 2). 
 Dual identity. In this condition, participants completed a Go/No-Go task 
designed to make them categorize social stimuli on two dimensions: school affiliation 
and race. They were presented with the same photos as in the previous condition, but 
were instructed to “go” if the stimulus was a White person (paired with either the Lake 
Forest College logo or St. Norbert College logo) or a Lake Forest College student (paired 
with either a Black or White face) (see Figure 3). 
 Nonhuman categorization control. In this condition, participants were presented 
with a series of stimulus pairings, each consisting of a photo of an animal (cat or dog) 
paired with a pet food brand label (Nature’s variety or Natural Balance). Participants 
were asked to “go” (press the spacebar) if the stimulus presented was a dog (paired with 
either Nature’s variety or Natural Balance logo) or was a Nature’s Variety logo (paired 
with either a cat or a dog) (see Figure 4). This condition was patterned after the dual 
identity condition because previous research (e.g., Richeson and Nussbau, 2003) showed 
that a dual identity manipulation was more effective at reducing implicit racial bias than  
decategorization or common ingroup manipulations. I presented participants with the 
same instructions as in the dual identity condition, but removed the critical stimuli (i.e., 
faces and school logos) and replaced them with stimuli that are unrelated to the 
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categorization of people (i.e., dogs, cats, and pet food logos). This condition served as a 
control in case mere exposure to the Go/No-Go training task improves performance on 
subsequent reaction time tasks and thereby improves performance on the IAT. In other 
words, if the dual identity manipulation is effective, participants in the dual identity 
condition should perform less prejudicially than participants in the nonhuman 
categorization control condition.  
Dependent Measures 
 Implicit prejudice. After the participants completed the categorization task they 
were asked to complete the main dependent measure: the IAT. The IAT is a computer-
administered reaction time test that is thought to quantify the implicit attitudes that an 
individual possesses. Each IAT includes several blocks of trials. On each trial, either a 
word or a photo of a person’s face is presented, and participants have to categorize that 
stimulus appropriately by pressing a particular computer key. For example, in one block 
of trials the category “Black people” is in the upper left-hand corner of the screen and the 
category label “White people” is in the upper right-hand corner of the screen. When a 
picture of a person appears in the middle of the screen, participants have to note whether 
the person is Black or White by pressing a designated key on either the left or right side 
of the keyboard (see Figure 5). On another block of trials, the words “good” and “bad” 
appear in the upper left-hand and upper right-hand corners of the screen, respectively, 
and participants have to categorize each stimulus word (a good or bad word) into one of 
the two categories, “good words” or “bad words” (see Figure 6). 
 After these blocks of trials, participants are presented with combined trials that 
include both categories (Black and White) and both attributes (good and bad). For 
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example, in a stereotype-consistent block, the words “Black” and “bad” are presented on 
the top left-hand corner and the words “White” and “good” are presented in the top right-
hand corner. In the middle of the screen, either a photo of a Black or White person is 
presented or a good or bad word is presented (see Figure 7). The participant then has to 
place the stimulus in the appropriate category using the corresponding key. On 
subsequent blocks, the pairings change and become counter-stereotypic. For example, the 
words “Black” and “good” are presented on the top left-hand corner and the words 
“White and “bad” are presented in the top right-hand corner (see Figure 8). These are the 
critical blocks that are used to compute the difference between the average reaction time 
of counterstereotypic trials and stereotypic trials. For example, if a participant responds 
more quickly on stereotypic “White and good” trials than on counter stereotypic “Black 
and good” trials, this shows that this participant tends to associate Whites with positive 
attributes and Blacks with negative attributes (i.e., is implicitly prejudiced against 
Blacks). In the present experiment, four different versions of the IAT were used to 
control for order effects (see Tables 3-6).  
Bar-Anan and Nosek (2013) report that the IAT is widely used and has good 
psychometric properties.  They compared seven indirect attitude measures (IAT, Brief 
IAT Go/No-Go association task, Single-Target IAT, Sorting Paired Features, Evaluative-
Priming task, and Affective Misattribution Procedure) across three attitude domains 
(race, politics, and self-esteem) to see which is the most internally consistent and has the 
best test-retest reliability. They found that the IAT was the most internally consistent 
measure (Cronbach’s α = .88) of the six. The Brief IAT had the best test-retest reliability 
(r = .63), but the longer IAT came in second (r  = .45). 
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 Explicit prejudice. After the participants completed the IAT, they completed a 
measure of explicit prejudice: the SRK2 (Henry & Sears, 2010) (see Appendix B). This 
scale is composed of items from both the Modern and Symbolic Racism Scales. Henry 
and Sears (2010) explain that Symbolic Racism is conceptualized as a unidimensional 
construct representing prejudice towards Blacks. This scale consists of four themes: (1) 
Blacks don’t work hard enough; they are responsible for their outcomes, (2) Blacks are 
making excessive demands, (3) racial discrimination has disappeared or is no longer a 
problem, and (4) Blacks have an undeserved advantage. Individuals who score high on 
this scale endorse four these themes. Henry and Sears (2010) report that the scale has 
good psychometric properties: 
 Internal consistency. The scale is internally consistent for White participants in 
multiple subsamples (Cronbach’s αs = .73 to .79).   
 Convergent and discriminant validity. Confirmatory factor analysis found 
separate factors for racial prejudice and conservative political dispositions. The SRK2 
loaded on both factors equally, showing that it is a blend of both factors as the authors 
had intended.   
 Predictive validity. The SRK2 scale predicts racial policy preferences better than 
traditional racial attitudes and political predispositions. 
Results 
Computation of Prejudice Measures 
Implicit prejudice: IAT-D scores. The IAT score, often referred to as the IAT 
effect, is the average reaction time on counterstereotypic trials minus the average reaction 
time on stereotypic trials, divided by the standard deviation on both sets of trials 
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combined. Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) introduced a recommended scoring 
procedure that has been used in most studies of implicit bias. This scoring algorithm is 
presented in Table 7. IAT-D scores can range from -2 (prejudice in favor of Black 
people) to +2 (prejudice in favor of White people), with scores of zero indicating that the 
groups are equally favored. Based on their research, Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 
(2003) suggest that IAT-D scores can be interpreted as follows: 0.15 = slight bias, 0.35 = 
moderate bias, and 0.65 = strong bias.  
Explicit prejudice: SR2K scale scores. Internal consistency reliability analysis 
was run on the SR2K scale to see if the eight items were correlated with one another. 
Results revealed a high level of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .835; see Table 8). 
However, according to the item-total statistics, one item (“Some saw that Black leaders 
have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven’t pushed fast enough. What 
do you think?”) was not highly correlated with the other items in the scale (corrected 
inter-item total correlation = .21). This is not surprising, given that this item was scaled 
on a 3-point scale, rather than a 4-point scale like the rest of the items. When this item 
was excluded, the internal consistency reliability of the scale increased (Cronbach’s α = 
.850; see Table 9). The remaining analyses thus did not include this item as part of the 
SR2K Scale. Scales on the remaining seven items were then averaged together to yield an 
SR2K Scale score for each participant that retained the original items’ 4-point metric. 
High scores in this scale indicated high self-reported prejudice toward Black people  
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Political identification. Across the sample, 55.4% of the participants identified as 
liberal to some degree, and the remaining participants identified as conservative to some 
degree or neutral (see Figure 9).  
Prior exposure to the IAT. Participants’ exposure to the IAT (Group’em Game) 
ranged from 0 to at least 6 times. The majority of the participants (69.59%) reported no 
prior exposure to the IAT (see Figure 10).  
IAT scores. Overall, the observed IAT effect revealed a moderate automatic 
preference for Whites over Blacks (M = 0.34, SD = .034). The distribution of scores was 
somewhat negatively skewed (skew = -0.07, SE = 0.02) and leptokurtic (kurtosis = 2.39, 
SE = 0.40) (see Figure 11). According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, the 
distribution of non-Black participants’ IAT scores did not deviate significantly from 
normal, D (143) = .037, p = .20.  
SR2K scores. The distribution of scores was slightly negatively skewed (skew =  
- 0.51, SE = 0.20) and kurtosis was not significant (see Figure 12). The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of normality shows that the distribution of non-Black participants’ SRK2 
scores deviates from normality, D (143) = .113, p = .000. It is not surprising to find that 
SRK2 scores are negatively skewed because it is unlikely that participants would 
explicitly report their prejudiced views.  
The Impact of Categorization Condition on Prejudice 
Implicit prejudice (IAT): Non-Black participants. Cerruti and Shin’s (Lai et 
al., 2014; Intervention 15, Study 2) study of the impact of evaluative conditioning (with 
the GNAT) on IAT scores used a sample of non-Black participants. Thus, statistical 
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 24 
analyses in the present study were run first on all non-Black participants. A one-way 
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of type of categorization 
(evaluative conditioning, common ingroup, dual identity, and non-human categorization 
control) on IAT-D scores. This test showed a small, but significant effect for 
categorization condition, F (3,139) = 2.881, p = .038, d = .059. Since the one-way 
ANOVA was significant, post- hoc tests were run. Fisher’s least significant difference 
(LSD) tests indicated that the mean score for evaluative conditioning group (M = .20, SD 
= .31) is significantly lower than the common ingroup (M = .40, SD = .29) and dual 
identity (M = .40, SD = .32) conditions (see Table 10). However, evaluative conditioning 
did not significantly differ from the non-human categorization control. In other words, 
participants in the evaluative conditioning condition exhibited significantly less implicit 
bias on the IAT than participants in the dual identity or common ingroup identity 
conditions.  
Explicit prejudice (SR2K): Non-Black participants. Because the type of 
categorization affected participants’ levels of implicit bias (IAT score), I wanted to see if 
it also affected participants’ levels of explicit bias (SRK scale). A one-way between- 
subjects ANOVA was conducted again to compare the effect of type of categorization 
(evaluative conditioning, common ingroup, dual identity, and non-human categorization 
control) on explicit prejudice (SR2K score). Type of categorization had no impact on 
explicit bias. There were no significant mean differences across conditions, F (3, 139) = 
.571, p = .635, d = .012 (see Table 11). 
Implicit Prejudice (IAT): White participants only. Although Cerruti and Shin 
(Lai et al., 2014; Intervention 15, Study 2) included all non-Black participants in their 
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analyses, one could argue that including non-White participants of any sort in the present 
study would be problematic. Dual identity manipulations encourage participants to 
embrace multiple ingroups (e.g., school affiliation and race) and in my experiment this 
manipulation was designed with the assumption that the participant identified with both 
White people and Lake Forest College students (it instructed participants to respond 
[“Go”] if the stimulus person was White or was affiliated with Lake Forest). Thus, in 
order to see if the dual identity condition was effective, analyses had to be run on White 
participants only. A one-way between subjects ANOVA was run to compare the effect of 
type of categorization (evaluative conditioning, common ingroup, dual identity and non-
human categorization control) on White participants’ implicit bias (IAT score). The test 
showed no significant mean differences across categorization conditions, F (3,103) = 
1.003, p = .395, d = .028) (see Table 12).  
Explicit prejudice (SR2K): White participants only. Even though the one-way 
ANOVA showed that type of categorization did not affect implicit bias (IAT score) for 
White participants, it may have affected explicit prejudice (SR2K) scores. Therefore, a 
one-way between-subjects ANOVA that compared the effect of type of categorization 
(evaluative conditioning, common ingroup, dual identity, and non-human categorization 
control) on White participants’ explicit bias (SR2K score) was conducted. It revealed no 
significant differences across conditions, F (3,103) = 1.236, p = .300, d = .035 (see Table 
13).  
Discussion 
 
 The present research was able to replicate Cerruti’s and Shin’s results (Lai et al., 
2014; Intervention 15, Study 2), which demonstrated that evaluative conditioning via the 
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GNAT reduces implicit racial bias in non-Black participants. This suggests that if 
participants are instructed to connect Black people and positive words, they will 
subsequently show less pro-White bias on the IAT.  However, the reduction in implicit 
bias was not present when the analysis was run on White participants only. The cause of 
this discrepancy is unclear. One possibility is that it reflects sampling differences, but this 
would explain the results only if the non-White, non-Black participants (e.g., Asians) 
were much more susceptible to evaluative conditioning than were White participants. A 
more likely explanation is related to statistical power. Cerruti and Shin had a very large 
sample size and a power of above .90. When only White participants were included in the 
analyses, the power of the present study to detect an effect as large as that observed by 
Cerruti and Shin (d = .56) was only .60.   
Regardless of the sub-sample analyzed (non-Blacks or Whites), however, this 
study showed that when the association induced by evaluative conditioning is removed 
and participants are strictly asked to respond [‘Go’] in response to the common ingroup 
identity or dual identity categorization manipulation, the effect is no longer present. 
These categorization manipulations alone were not sufficient to reduce racial bias. This 
means either that categorization alone does not work, or that categorization does work, 
but only under conditions that were not represented in the present research.  
Manipulating Categorization Alone is Not Enough to Reduce Implicit Prejudice  
Setting aside the question of whether evaluative conditioning is effective, the 
present results suggest that manipulating categorization alone using the common ingroup 
identity or the dual identity model is insufficient to reduce implicit racial bias. These 
results may not seem surprising, given the fundamental role of social categorization in the 
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life and mind of humans. According to Nelson (2006), one of the reasons people 
categorize social stimuli is because group living is crucial for human survival. 
Evolutionarily speaking, forming groups allowed people to divide responsibilities among 
one another. That division of labor enriched everyone’s way of life. However, in order for 
it to work, people had to cooperate and trust the individuals they were working with; thus 
people spontaneously organized the world around them into "friends" and "foe."  
Jones, Dovidio, and Vietze (2014) explain that social categorization is also 
functional at the individual level. People engage in social categorization because they are 
exposed to a multitude of stimuli every day. In order to process and comprehend 
everything around them, they need to simplify their perceptions of the world. Social 
categorization helps people organize their perceptions of others and ultimately serves as a 
guide to behavior.  Once people categorize an individual they see that that person has 
similar attributes to other members of their group. By seeing a person as a member of a 
social group, people can engage in top-down processing; they form ideas about what an 
individual is like by using the information they know about what people in that group are 
generally like. Eventually people can automatically determine if the individuals they 
encounter are a member of their ingroup or an outgroup. The members that people view 
as their ingroup they see as part of their community; they depend on and trust these 
individuals.   
Social categorization is crucial for social survival; however, this would not be 
possible if our brains did not develop in a way that allowed people to make these 
adaptations. In fact, infants are able to distinguish faces of different races by three months 
of age (Kelly et al., 2005). By adulthood categorization by race is automatic; within 
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approximately 100 milliseconds people can distinguish the race of an individual (Ito & 
Urland, 2003). Despite some people’s claim that they do not see race, research indicates 
that colorblindness is truly not possible in today’s society (Apfelbaum, Norton, & 
Sommers, 2012).  
Amodio and Lieberman (2009) explain that the human brain has many systems 
that are sensitive to racial or ethnic cues. Many studies have focused on the fusiform face 
area (FFA). For example, Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, and Eberhardt (2001) tested whether 
people remember faces of their own race better than other races. They placed their 
participants in an fMRI and presented them with White and Black faces and measured the 
activation of the FFA and then tested how well people could recall the specific faces they 
were shown. They found that White participants exhibited greater FFA activation when 
they were presented with White faces and they had a better memory of the White faces 
than the Black faces. Black participants showed the same pattern of own-race bias (i.e., 
greater FFA activation and better memory for Black faces). The amygdala also plays a 
key role. It helps people react to novel and/or threatening stimuli (Amodio, 2008; 
Chekroud, Everett, Bridge, & Hewstone, 2014; Cikara & Van Baval, 2014; Jones et al., 
2014). Jones et al. (2014) explain that this evolutionary adaption is functional, yet 
sometimes hinders humans today because signals of threat are sent to the amygdala at 
inappropriate times (e.g., the brain of a person who is not used to seeing Black faces may 
interpret that face as a threat).  
All of this suggests that it is impossible to stop people from engaging in 
categorization. However, it is possible to change the dimension on which people 
categorize (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). This raises the question as to why 
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previous research (Cameron et al., 2006; Crisp & Beck, 2016; Gaertner et al., 1989; 
Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2003) was able to reduce implicit 
bias, but the current study was not. This finding may be due to the fact that these studies 
either employed minimal groups rather than real-life racial groups (Gaertner et al., 1989), 
or allowed the groups to converse with one another and develop friendships (Cameron et 
al., 2006; Crisp & Beck, 2016; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2003). 
It may be that categorization alone is not enough, and the only way to reduce implicit 
prejudice is to have these contributing factors.  
 Minimal groups. Gaertner et al. (1989) randomly assigned participants to an 
ingroup (using the minimal groups paradigm) rather than asking them to categorize a 
preexisting ingroup (e.g., Lake Forest College affiliation or White). Research has 
demonstrated that the creation of minimal groups can induce a preference for the minimal 
ingroup. For example, Dunham (2011) showed children a red coin and blue coin, which 
then were hidden behind the experimenter’s back and shuffled. Afterward, the 
experimenter brought his or her hands forward and asked the child to select a hand. 
Depending on the coin the child selected, the child was assigned to that group. Dunham’s 
results revealed a preference for the minimal ingroup on three of the four measures 
(explicit attitude, implicit attitude and resource allocation). However, even though such 
research has shown that minimal groups are successful at creating a preference for the 
ingroup, this does not mean that participants identify with their minimal ingroups as 
strongly as they do their preexisting ingroups. It could be that Gaertner et al.’s 
participants had an easier time finding a common ingroup or decategorizing completely 
because they did not identify very strongly with the minimal groups to which they were 
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assigned. On the other hand, my participants were asked to either: ignore their race and 
only focus on school affiliation, or identify with their race but also include school 
affiliation. This may be hard to do because research has shown that an individuals’ race is 
his or her most salient ingroup (Amodio, 2014; Cameron & Rutland, 2006; Glasford & 
Dovidio, 2011).  
 Additional information about outgroup members. Other studies made use of 
existing racial groups rather than minimal groups, but went beyond manipulating 
categorization and provided new information about group members. For example, 
Cameron et al. (2006) wanted to change children’s attitudes toward refugees and did so 
by telling ingroup members (i.e., students at the same school) a friendship story about 
ingroup members forming close relationships with outgroup members (i.e., refugees). 
The story the children were told varied across conditions. Results showed that attitudes 
toward outgroup members were significantly more positive for children in the common 
ingroup or dual identity condition compared to the control (i.e., no story presented). The 
findings of Cameron et al. suggest that categorization alone may not be enough, and the 
reason the children’s negative attitudes toward refugees improved was because they were 
able to relate to the refugee kids. The children were exposed to lots of details about these 
characters (e.g., what they like to do). As a result, that they developed a sense of who 
those characters were as people, but do not necessarily mean the children dentify them as 
members of their ingroup. Dual identity is the model that does this most effectively 
because it allows the participant to develop a better sense of what it means to be a 
member of that outgroup (i.e., refugee); this learning allows the participant to potentially 
reject any preconceived notions they may have had about that outgroup.  
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Manipulating Categorization Alone is Enough Under the Right Conditions  
 It is possible that manipulating categorization alone is never sufficient to reduce 
implicit racial bias, but there may be other reasons why these manipulations did not work. 
It could be that additional conditions need to be met in order for categorization 
manipulations to reduce implicit bias.  Some possibilities include: (1) participants must 
be motivated to reduce bias, (2) participants must feel that they are categorizing social 
stimuli, and (3) the manipulation must occur before participants reach an age at which 
race has become a salient group.  
  Were my participants motivated? Even if the IAT was an appropriate measure 
of implicit bias, the lack of significant results may have been due to participants’ lack of 
motivation to control their bias. For example, previous research has shown that the 
amygdala responds to emotion (e.g., responds more to fearful than to neutral facial 
expressions) regardless of whether stimuli are presented for long periods of time or 
briefly (Davis & Whalden, 2001; Morris, 2006). Earlier research has shown that White 
people have negative associations with Black people. While one might expect greater 
amygdala activation when a White person sees a Black face compared to a White face, 
current studies have not observed these results (Hart, Whalen, Shin, McInerney, & 
Rauch, 2000; Phelps, O’Connor,  
Cunningham, Johnson, Raye, Gatenby, Gore, and Banaji (2004) were puzzled by 
this and thought it might be because two separate neural processes are occurring: an 
automatic and a controlled process. They studied this possibility during event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) by exposing White participants to Black 
and White faces for 30 ms (automatic process condition) or 525 ms (controlled process 
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condition) and examining which brain regions were activated. After scanning, 
participants took the IAT and completed a self-report questionnaire (Modern Racism 
Scale and Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale).  
 Their results showed that during the automatic process (30 ms presentation of 
faces), activation of the amygdala was greater for Black than for White faces. However, 
during the controlled process (525 ms presentation of faces), activation of the amygdala 
was significantly reduced. Regions of the frontal cortex (dorsolateral PFC, anterior 
cingulate cortex, and ventrolateral PFC) were also more active for Black faces than White 
faces when presented for 525ms. They also found that amygdala activation was 
correlated with participants’ IAT scores. That is, the more pro-White bias participants 
showed on the IAT, the greater their amygdala activity for Black faces relative to White 
faces in the 30-ms condition. Furthermore, activation in the ventrolateral PFC was 
correlated with attitudinal ambivalence (i.e., participants’ brains appear to fear Black 
faces, but participants’ self-reports show they have egalitarian tendencies), thus 
suggesting that these participants were trying to control the prejudicial tendencies they 
have toward Black faces.  
 Cunnigham et al.’s (2004) study showed that there is a neural distinction between 
automatic and controlled processing of social groups. Fortunately, participants in the 
present study were presented with stimuli for 900ms, which means their controlled 
process was activated, giving them the opportunity to control their prejudicial tendencies. 
However, one limitation is that I did not measure participants’ levels of motivation.  
Therefore, it is possible that my manipulation of categorization could be effective, but my 
participants lacked the motivation to control their bias. With this in mind, future studies 
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should expose participants to White and Black faces for 30 ms and 525 ms to see if 
participants are motivated to control their implicit bias (i.e., have more activation of the 
frontal cortex when presented with Black faces compared to White faces for 525ms).  
Afterward, if the fMRI shows a participant has little motivation to control bias, then he or 
she should not be included in the study. Future studies should have a sample in which all 
of the participants are motivated and then incorporate the categorization manipulation to 
see whether categorization alone is truly enough.  
Was my manipulation considered a social categorization task? Research 
indicates that stereotyping is malleable and that individuals’ social goals play an 
important role in whether they exhibit prejudiced responses (Amodio, 2014). Wheeler 
and Fiske (2005), for example, used fMRI to investigate how social goals control 
prejudiced responses. All participants viewed photographs of unfamiliar Black and White 
faces, and amygdala activation was recorded. However, the instructions that were given 
varied across conditions. Participants were placed in one of three conditions (socially 
neutral condition, social categorization, and social individuation). In the socially neutral 
condition, participants determined whether a dot was present somewhere on each face. 
This task was designed to encourage participants to process the photos as simple, 
nonsocial visual stimuli. In the social categorization condition, participants had to 
determine whether the person in each photo belonged to a particular social group (i.e., 
was the person over 21 years of age) Finally, in the social individuation condition, 
participants were asked if the person in each photo would like a particular vegetable. This 
task was designed to make participants view each face as an individual by elaborating on 
personal characteristics (i.e., do they like the vegetable presented).  
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 For the social neutral condition, Wheeler and Fiske's results revealed no 
difference in amygdala activity during the presentation of White and Black faces. In 
contrast, during the social categorization condition, there was a significant difference in 
left amygdala activity during the presentation of White faces versus Black faces. Finally, 
during social individuation, activity in the right amygdala was suppressed when a 
participant was presented with Black faces. Accordingly, future studies should make sure 
that participants feel more connected to the stimuli and see the task as a social 
categorization task.  For example, one might use photos of actual Lake Forest College 
students to make the manipulation seem more real and reduce the likelihood that 
participants are just responding to neutral instructions. Also, the experimenter could 
stress that the faces present are people from their school (i.e., part of their team) without 
mentioning additional information about the individual or letting participants have direct 
contact with those individuals. Similarly, it could be helpful to stress which faces are the 
opponent faces (i.e., St. Norbert College), and to mention that they are the rival team, 
while still avoiding providing additional information about the person.   
Was it too late for my participants? Developmental research suggests that 
social categories (e.g., gender and race) are meaningful to young children and acquisition 
of social identity is a primary goal (Cameron & Rutland, 2006). However, Telzer, 
Humphreys, Shapiro and Tottenham (2013) wanted to know neurologically at what age 
race becomes a salient ingroup for children. These researchers noted that neuroimaging 
studies have demonstrated that White adults show increased amygdala activation, even in 
the absence of conscious awareness, when presented with Black faces instead of White 
faces. They were also curious to see if this amygdala activation is present when Black 
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adults view Blacks faces. These researchers hypothesized that at a certain age, the bias 
(i.e., different levels of amygdala activation when presented with Black faces versus 
White faces) becomes prevalent. They tested their hypothesis using an fMRI to examine 
amygdala responses to race across childhood and adolescence.  
 Telzer et al.'s (2013) sample included children between the ages of four and 16.5 
years. During the fMRI scan, participants were shown three faces and asked which faces 
were expressing the same emotion (the faces displayed were either happy, sad or neutral). 
Their results showed no difference in amygdala activation when presented with White or 
Black faces until the age of 14. Interestingly, the same effect was present when Black 
participants viewed Black faces, suggesting that the differentiation in amygdala 
activation may not be due to categorization, but instead due to how Blacks are seen in 
society. This study gives society two options for reducing implicit bias: (1) change the 
way society sees Black people, which is unlikely, or (2) change the way people 
categorize at a young age (preferably before 14 years old). For this to be effective, 
children must be primed multiple times to categorize differently.  
Practical Implications and Directions for Future Studies 
 Even if all of the conditions that are needed for categorization manipulations to be 
effective were met, at least two questions remain: would reductions in implicit bias 
generalize to real life settings, and would the reductions in implicit bias persist?   
Does the reduction in implicit bias translate in to real life? The present 
research, like most research in this area, relied on the IAT as a measure of implicit bias. 
The developers of the IAT report that the test has good predicative validity and support 
this claim with a meta-analysis of more than 100 studies (Greenwald, Poehlman, 
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Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). However, the IAT has some critics. For example, Oswald, 
Mitchell, Blanton, and Jaccard (2013 conducted another meta-analysis which disputes its 
predictive validity. In particular, they investigated how well the IAT can predict six 
categories of criterion measures that are known indicators of discrimination: (1) 
interpersonal behaviors (measures of written or verbal behavior during an intergroup 
interaction, such as a choice in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game); (2) person perception 
(explicit judgments of others); (3) policy preferences (references for specific public 
policies that may affect the welfare of majority or minority groups, such as support for 
affirmative action); (4) microbehaviors (nonverbal and subtle verbal behaviors); (5) 
response times (stimulus response latencies, on the shooter test, for example); and (6) 
brain activity (neurological activity while processing faces). Their results showed that 
IAT scores correlated strongly with brain activity but relatively weakly with other 
criterion measures. This suggests the IAT it is actually a poor predictor of individuals’ 
judgments, decisions, and behaviors in other automatic tasks (e.g., the shooter test). 
These researchers also ran correlations between explicit bias measures and these criterion 
measures, and found that explicit measures were also poor predicators of these criterion 
measures. This raises an important issue for future research. If prejudice-reduction 
interventions improve IAT scores, but fail to effect behaviors in everyday life they will 
be of limited utility.  
Are there long-term effects? Assuming the effects of categorization 
manipulations generalize to real life situations, the question of how long they persist is 
important. Because real- world categories develop over a lifetime of experiences, one 
cannot help but wonder whether categorization manipulations would be strong enough to 
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override them. Shin (Lai et al., 2016; Intervention 7), for example, examined whether the 
reduction in implicit bias produced by evaluative conditioning would persist over time 
(Lai et al., 2014; Intervention 15; Study 2). In a follow up study, two-thirds of the 
participants were instructed to take a pretest IAT, while the other one-third was instructed 
to do nothing. Afterward, some participants were given the GNAT. As the final part of 
the first session, participants completed a posttest IAT and explicit prejudice measure. 
After two or four days, participants were given the IAT again and an explicit measure. 
Results showed that evaluative conditioning (using the GNAT) significantly reduced IAT 
scores relative to the control condition at the posttest, but this reduction disappeared 
during the follow up study. Also, the intervention did not impact explicit racial prejudice. 
Shin, in her follow up, demonstrated that the reduction in implicit bias does not last, even 
when using evaluative conditioning. In the end, societal changes will be needed. As long 
as people are constantly exposed to negative cultural stereotypes about Black, racial 
categorization is unlikely to change.  
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Table 1 
Racial/Ethnic Composition of the Sample (N=148)  
 
 Self-Reported Race and Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
RACE   
 American Indian/Alaskan Native 
 
2 1.4 
 East Asian 3 2.0 
 South Asian 1 .7 
 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
 
3 2.0 
 Black or African American 5 3.4 
 White 107 72.3 
 Other or unknown 15 10.1 
 Multiracial 12 8.1 
ETHNICITY   
 Hispanic or Latino 28 18.9 
 Not Hispanic or Latino 117 79.1 
 Unknown 3 2.0 
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Table 2 
Distribution of the 100 Categorization Trials by Categorization Condition 
     
Categorization 
condition 
Pairing 1 
 
Pairing 2 
 
Pairing 3 Pairing 4 Which 
pairings are 
"go" trials 
Evaluative 
conditioning 
Black + Good 
words = 
60/100  
White + Good 
words = 
10/100 
Black + Bad  
words = 
30/100 
White + Bad 
words = 0/100 
Pairing 1 
Common 
ingroup 
Black + Lake 
Forest College 
logo = 30/100 
White + Lake 
Forest College 
logo = 30/100 
 
Black + St. 
Norbert  
logo = 20/100 
White + St. 
Norbert  
logo = 20/100 
Pairings 1 and 
2 
Dual identity Black + Lake 
Forest College 
logo = 30/100 
White + Lake 
Forest College 
logo = 30/100 
Black + St. 
Norbert  
logo = 20/100 
White + St. 
Norbert 
logo = 20/100 
Pairings 1,2 
and 3 
Nonhuman 
categorization 
control 
Cat + Nature’s 
Variety  
logo = 30/100 
Dog + 
Nature’s 
Variety  
logo = 30/100 
Cat + Natural 
Balance  
logo = 20/100 
Dog + Natural 
Balance  
logo = 20/100 
 
Pairings 1, 2 
and 3 
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Table 3 
Sequence of Trial Blocks in Implicit Association Test (IAT) Version 1 
Block Number of Trials Items assigned to 
left-key response (E) 
Items assigned to 
right-key response 
(I) 
1 20 Black faces White faces  
2 20 Good words Bad words 
3* 20 Black faces +  
Good words 
White faces +  
Bad words 
4* 40 Black faces + 
Good words 
White faces +  
Bad words  
5 40 White faces Black faces 
6* 20 White faces +  
Good words 
Black faces + 
Bad words 
7* 40 White faces +  
Good words 
Black faces +  
Bad words 
8 20 Black faces White faces 
9 20 Bad words Good words 
10* 20 Black faces +  
Bad words 
White faces +  
Good words 
11* 40 Black faces + 
Bad words 
White faces +  
Good words 
12 40 White faces Black faces 
13* 20 White faces + 
Bad words 
Black faces + 
Good words 
14* 40 White faces +  
Bad words 
Black faces +  
Good words 
 
Note: Trials in blocks with an asterisk were used to calculate the IAT D measure for each  
participant. 
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Table 4 
Sequence of Trial Blocks in Implicit Association Test (IAT) Version 2 
Block Number of Trials Items assigned to 
left-key response (E) 
Items assigned to 
right-key response 
(I) 
1 20 White faces Black faces  
2 20 Good words Bad words 
3* 20 White faces +  
Good words 
Black faces +  
Bad words 
4* 40 White faces + 
Good words 
Black faces +  
Bad words  
5 40 Black faces White faces 
6* 20 Black faces +  
Good words 
White faces + 
Bad words 
7* 40 Black faces +  
Good words 
White faces +  
Bad words 
8 20 White faces Black faces 
9 20 Bad words Good words 
10* 20 White faces +  
Bad words 
Black faces +  
Good words 
11* 40 White faces + 
Bad words 
Black faces +  
Good words 
12 40 Black faces White faces 
13* 20 Black faces + 
Bad words 
White faces + 
Good words 
14* 40 Black faces +  
Bad words 
White faces +  
Good words 
 
Note: Trials in blocks with an asterisk were used to calculate the IAT D measure for each  
participant. 
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Table 5 
Sequence of Trial Blocks in Implicit Association Test (IAT) Version 3 
Block Number of Trials Items assigned to 
left-key response (E) 
Items assigned to 
right-key response 
(I) 
1 20 Black faces White faces  
2 20 Good words Bad words 
3* 20 Black faces +  
Good words 
White faces +  
Bad words 
4* 40 Black faces + 
Good words 
White faces +  
Bad words  
5 40 White faces Black faces 
6* 20 White faces +  
Good words 
Black faces + 
Bad words 
7* 40 White faces +  
Good words 
Black faces +  
Bad words 
8 20 White faces Black faces 
9 20 Bad words Good words 
10* 20 White faces +  
Bad words 
Black faces +  
Good words 
11* 40 White faces + 
Bad words 
Black faces +  
Good words 
12 40 Black faces White faces 
13* 20 Black faces + 
Bad words 
White faces + 
Good words 
14* 40 Black faces +  
Bad words 
White faces +  
Good words 
 
Note: Trials in blocks with an asterisk were used to calculate the IAT D measure for each  
participant. 
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Table 6 
Sequence of Trial Blocks in Implicit Association Test (IAT) Version 4 
Block Number of Trials Items assigned to 
left-key response (E) 
Items assigned to 
right-key response 
(I) 
1 20 White faces Black faces  
2 20 Good words Bad words 
3* 20 White faces +  
Good words 
Black faces +  
Bad words 
4* 40 White faces + 
Good words 
Black faces +  
Bad words  
5 40 Black faces White faces 
6* 20 Black faces +  
Good words 
White faces + 
Bad words 
7* 40 Black faces +  
Good words 
White faces +  
Bad words 
8 20 Black faces White faces 
9 20 Bad words Good words 
10* 20 Black faces +  
Bad words 
White faces +  
Good words 
11* 40 Black faces + 
Bad words 
White faces +  
Good words 
12 40 Black faces White faces 
13* 20 White faces + 
Bad words 
Black faces + 
Good words 
14* 40 White faces +  
Bad words 
Black faces +  
Good words 
 
Note: Trials in blocks with an asterisk were used to calculate the IAT D measure for each  
participant. 
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Table 7 
Summary of Implicit Association Test (IAT) Scoring Procedures Recommended by 
Greenwald et al. (2003) 
1. Delete trials greater than 10,000 msec 
2. Delete subjects for whom more than 10% of trials have latency less than 300 msec 
3. Compute the “inclusive” standard deviation for all trials in Blocks 3 and 6 and likewise 
for all trials in 4 and 7 
4. Compute the mean latency for responses for each of Blocks 3, 4, 6, 7. 
5. Compute the two mean differences (MeanBlock3 – MeanBlock6) and (MeanBlock4 – 
MeanBlock7) 
6. Divide each difference score by its associated “inclusive” standard deviation 
7. D = the equal-weight average of the two resulting ratios 
 
Note. For Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003, Table 4). Same computation is done for 
Blocks 10, 11, 13 and 14. Block 10 is paired with Block 13; Block 11 is paired with Block 
14. This is the scoring procedure for IAT Version 1. In every version, the means for 
stereotypical blocks are subtracted from the means for counterstereotypical blocks, so that 
positive D scores indicate more implicit (pro-White) bias. 
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Table 8 
Preliminary Reliability Analysis of Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SRK2) (all 8 Items) 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Blacks don’t try 
hard enough* 
 
12.7635 13.651 .610 .810 
Other 
minorities 
overcame 
prejudice 
Blacks should 
do the same* 
 
12.3176 13.647 .516 .824 
Black leaders 
have been 
trying to push 
too fast* 
 
12.4730 16.482 .209 .850 
How much 
racial tension 
are Blacks 
responsible for* 
 
12.0676 12.839 .626 .808 
How much 
discrimination 
against Blacks 
is there in the 
United States 
 
12.7432 14.342 .581 .815 
Slavery made it 
hard for Blacks 
to get out of the 
lower class* 
 
12.4797 12.727 .692 .797 
Blacks have 
gotten less than 
they deserve 
 
12.3784 12.835 .699 .797 
Blacks got more 
economically 
than they 
deserve* 
12.6689 14.495 .556 .818 
 
Note: Items with an asterisk were reversed keyed. Cronbach’s alpha for the 8 items was .835. 
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Table 9 
Final Reliability Analysis of Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SRK2) with Item 3 Excluded  
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Blacks don’t try 
hard enough* 
 
12.7635 13.651 .610 .810 
Other 
minorities 
overcame 
prejudice 
Blacks should 
do the same* 
 
12.3176 13.647 .516 .824 
How much 
racial tension 
are Blacks 
responsible for* 
 
12.0676 12.839 .626 .808 
How much 
discrimination 
against Blacks 
is there in the 
United States 
 
12.7432 14.342 .581 .815 
Slavery made it 
hard for Blacks 
to get out of the 
lower class* 
 
12.4797 12.727 .692 .797 
Blacks have 
gotten less than 
they deserve 
 
12.3784 12.835 .699 .797 
Blacks got more 
economically 
than they 
deserve* 
12.6689 14.495 .556 .818 
 
Note: Items with an asterisk were reversed keyed. Cronbach’s alpha for the 7 items was .850. 
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics: Implicit Association Test (IAT)  Scores by Type of Categorization Task for all Non-Black 
participants 
 
 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Evaluative 
conditioning 
36 .20  .31  .05  .10  .31  -.60 .96 
Common ingroup 35 .40  .29  .05  .30  .50  -.15 1.14 
Dual identity 36 .40  .32  .05  .29  .51  -.20 .99 
Control 36 .36  .41  .07  .22  .50  -1.30 .93 
Total 143 .34  .34  .03  .28  .40  -1.30 1.14      
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     Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics: Symbolic Racism 2000 (SRK2) Scale Scores by Type of Categorization for all Non-Black participants 
 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Evaluative 
conditioning 
36 1.83 .61 .10 1.62 2.04 1.00 3.00 
Common ingroup 35 1.73 .54 .09 1.54 1.91 1.00 3.00 
Dual Identity 36 1.89 .65 .11 1.67 2.11 1.00 3.43 
Control 36 1.75 .52 .09 1.58 1.93 1.00 2.71 
Total 143 1.80 .58 .05 1.70 1.90 1.00 3.43 
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  Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics: Implicit Association Test (IAT) Scores by Type of Categorization for White participants only 
 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Evaluative 
conditioning 
23 .31 .26 .05 .20 .42 -.04 .96 
Common ingroup 29 .43 .30 .06 .32 .55 -.15 1.14 
Dual Identity 26 .44 .34 .07 .30 .58 -.17 .99 
Control 29 .33 .43 .08 .17 .50 -1.30 .93 
Total 107 .38 .34 .03 .32 .45 -1.30 1.14 
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Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics: Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SRK2) Scores by Type of Categorization for White participants only 
 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Evaluative 
conditioning 
36 1.97 .61 .13 1.70 2.23 1.00 3.00 
Common ingroup 35 1.72 .55 .10 1.51 1.94 1.00 3.00 
Dual Identity 36 1.99 .66 .13 1.72 2.26 1.00 3.43 
Control 36 1.82 .52 .10 1.62 2.02 1.00 2.71 
Total 143 1.87 .59 .06 1.76 1.98 1.00 3.43 
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Figure 1. Instructions given to participants in the evaluative conditioning manipulation and sample 
trial pairing indicating when to respond [‘Go’]. 
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Figure 2. Instructions given to participants in the common ingroup identity manipulation and a 
sample trial pairing indicating when to respond [‘Go’]. 
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Figure 3. Instructions given to participants in the dual identity condition and a sample trial pairing 
indicating when to respond [‘Go’].  
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Figure 4. Instructions given to participants in the non-human categorization control condition and a 
sample pairing indicating when to respond [‘Go’].  
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Figure 5. Sample trial of one of the blocks on the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants 
should press the E key if presented with this face (i.e., this is a Black face and therefore belongs in 
the left category). 
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Figure 6. Sample trial of one of the blocks on the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants 
should press the E key if presented with this work (i.e., "Joy" is considered a good word and belong 
in the left category).  
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Figure 7. Sample of a stereotypic trial on the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants should 
press the E key if presented with this face (i.e., this is a Black face and therefore belongs on the 
category on the left). 
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Figure 8. Sample of a counter-stereotypic trial on the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants 
should press the I key if presented with this face (i.e., this is a White face and therefore belongs to the 
category on the right).  
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Figure 9. Distribution of non-Black participants’ self-rated political identity.  
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Figure 10. Distribution of non-Black participants’ exposure to the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
(labeled Group’em). 
  
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 68 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of non-Black participants’ Implicit Association Test (IAT) D scores.  
  
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 69 
 
Figure 12. Distribution of non-Black participants’ Symbolic Racism Scale 2000 (SRK2) scores.  
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Appendix A 
 
Consent form 
 
In this study you will be asked to play two reaction time games on the computer. 
 
The first game is the Hit-or-Hold Game, the second is the Group’em Game. 
 
Afterward, you will answer a questionnaire. This study will take about 15-20 minutes. 
 
If your professor offers it, you may receive extra credit in a Psychology course by participating 
in this experiment. 
 
The only benefit you will receive is hands-on experience of what it is like to be a participant in a 
research study and the information you receive during debriefing. 
 
The responses you give will be kept confidential. While the researcher may use your data to 
write up the results of this study, your name and any other personally identifying information 
will never be used. 
 
You can withdraw from the study at any time, for any reason without any negative repercussions 
(e.g., will not lose extra credit). Furthermore, if participating becomes too stressful or 
uncomfortable, you should withdraw from the study. You have the right to skip any questions 
that you do not want to answer. 
 
 After you have completed the study, Agona Lutolli will explain the study, her intentions, and 
answer any questions you may have. If you have any further questions about the research later 
on, you can ask your questions through e-mail to Agona Lutolli at lutollia@mx.lakeforest.edu 
 
If you have concerns about whether your rights as a research participant have been violated or 
you have suffered any research-related harm, you can contact Professor Nancy Brekke, the 
faculty advisor of this thesis (brekke@mx.lakeforest.edu), or Professor Christopher Todd Beer, 
Chair of the Lake Forest College Human Subjects Review Committee (beer@mx.lakeforest.edu)  
 
If you have any questions or concerns please stop now and ask the experimenter. If not click on 
the button below 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I consent to participate in this 
experiment 
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Appendix B 
 
Symbolic Racism 2000 (SR2K) Scale 
 
Complete the following statements/questions on controversial issues as honestly as possible 
 
It’s really a matter of people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could 
be just as well off as Whites. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree 
 
Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. 
Blacks should do the same. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree 
 
Some saw that Black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven’t 
pushed fast enough. What do you think? 
1. 2. 3. 
Trying to go to fast Moving too slow Going at the right speed 
 
How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think Blacks are 
responsible for creating? 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
A lot Some Just a little None at all 
 
How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting 
their chances to get ahead. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
A lot Some Just a little None at all 
 
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for 
blacks to work their way out of the lower class 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree 
 
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree 
 
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. 
1.   2.   3.   4. 
Strongly agree  Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree 
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Appendix C 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Complete the following demographic questions about yourself as honestly as possible. 
 
What is your sex? 
 
a. b. c. 
Male Female Other 
 
What is your race? 
 
a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. 
American 
Indian 
East Asian South 
Asian 
Native 
Hawaiian 
or other 
Pacific 
Islander 
Black or 
African 
American 
White Other or 
Unknown 
Multiracial 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 
a. b. c. 
Hispanic Not Hispanic Unknown 
 
How many times have you taken a test similar to the Group’em Game? 
 
a. b. c. d. f. 
0 1 2 3-5 6+ 
 
What is your political identity? 
 
a. b. c. d. e. f. g. 
Strongly 
conservative 
Moderately 
conservative 
Slightly 
conservative 
Neutral Slightly 
liberal 
Moderately 
liberal 
Strongly 
liberal 
 
What’s your country/region of primary citizenship? 
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Appendix D 
 
Debrief Form 
 
 Previous research has demonstrated that people tend to feel more comfortable with, and 
hold more positive attitudes toward, members of their own groups. Sometimes this can cause 
them to favor their own groups at the expense of other groups. The purpose of this study is to 
determine whether subtly changing the ways in which people define “their” groups can influence 
people’s attitudes toward members of those groups. 
 The first game you played (Hit-or-Hold Game) was designed to influence the way in 
which people group pictures together. By repeatedly responding to some pictures and keeping 
yourself from responding to other pictures, you were presumably training your brain to place 
certain pictures into the same category 
 The question under investigation is whether changing which photos are placed into the 
same category will then influence people’s group-related attitudes. To find out, I made several 
versions of this game.  Some of you were asked to respond (‘Go’) when the stimulus was 
someone with Lake Forest College affiliation. Others were asked to respond (‘Go’) when the 
stimulus was someone affiliated with Lake Forest College or White face (paired with either Lake 
Forest College logo or St. Norbert logo), others were asked to respond (‘Go’) when a stimulus 
pair was a Black person paired with a positive word, and finally some were asked to respond 
(‘Go’) if you saw a cat paired with Nature’s Variety logo or a dog (paired with either Nature’s 
Variety logo or Natural Balance).  
 To measure people’s group-related attitudes, everyone was asked to complete two 
different measures.  One, the attitude questionnaire, tapped people’s conscious attitudes about 
racism and discrimination.  The other, what was labeled the “Group-Em” game in this study, was 
a measure of people’s unconscious racial associations known as the Implicit Association Test. To 
learn more about this particular test you can go to www.projectimplicit.com. 
 
 
 
  
